What Will Change in the Middle East after the Gaza War Ends?
Someday, probably later than sooner, Israel and Hamas will stop shooting at each other and relieved officials everyone can claim there is a ceasefire, even if limited violence still continues. If and when this occurs, the Lebanese Hezbollah may declare that it no longer needs a hot war with Israel in the name of solidarity with Hamas, allowing both Israel and Hezbollah to return to a tense ceasefire along Israel’s northern border. Even the more fanatical Houthis would be likely to balk at fighting a war on behalf of Hamas that Hamas itself is not fighting.
All this would be a dramatic improvement over the deadly and devastating conflict in Gaza and the constant risk of a devastating war between Israel and Hezbollah. Yet even a successful ceasefire would not put the Middle East back on the path it was on before Hamas October 7th attack. Although predicting the future in the Middle East is usually a fool’s game, I believe at least four major changes are likely that will shape regional dynamics – for the worse, of course – in the years to come.
First, Israel is likely to be less willing to tolerate risk from Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, or other threats. Before October 7th, various Israeli governments could comfortably tell their own people that Hamas seemed deterred, that Israeli intelligence could detect any large-scale attack, and that the Israeli military could easily defeat any Hamas incursion into Israel. All three assumptions were proven wrong on October 7th. It will be hard for Israeli officials in the future to make similar promises to their people, even when they are correct, whether the foe is Hezbollah, Hamas, or some other threat. Intelligence agencies will be less confident in their own assessments, particularly those predicting peace, and the Israeli people will trust them less. As a result, Israel is more likely to act, fearing that a failure to do so may result in another surprise attack and will be less tolerant of what in the past would have been limited provocations.
Second, the Palestinian Authority (PA), which in theory governs part of the West Bank, is even less relevant than it was before October 7th – and that is a low bar. Before the Hamas attacks, the PA was widely seen as corrupt and ineffective, but from an Israeli point of view the PA security forces played a critical role in keeping Hamas down in the West Bank. The PA was also the center of any vision for a two-state solution, and no official was quite willing to claim it was completely dead even as the body advanced its decay. Since the attacks, support among Palestinians for PA leader Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah organization have fallen even further, although this hasn’t led Abbas to step down. Israel’s military operation in the West Bank earlier this month in Jenin and other areas shows that Israel no longer trusts the PA as a partner for security. The Israeli attacks, and the rampant settler violence against ordinary Palestinians, further discredit the PA, creating a vicious circle, and violence on the West Bank is likely to continue at high levels.
Third, Hamas may have new allies in future wars. The Hezbollah-Israel, Iran-Israel, and Houthi-Israel conflicts that grew out of the Gaza war all stretch Israeli forces, create dangers and headaches for the United States and its Arab allies, and otherwise worsen an already-dangerous situation. In a future conflict, Hamas may expect these allies to again join in, making it more likely to attack. Even if these potential Hamas allies intend to do little, Israel may fear that they will again attack, creating incentives for preemptive strikes. This third possibility is less certain: October 7th and the Israeli response were off the charts compared to past Hamas-Israel clashes in Gaza, so it is possible that Hezbollah and the Houthis may choose to ignore smaller-scale conflicts, declaring solidarity with Hamas but doing little in practice.
Fourth, as I have written in Foreign Affairs, Gaza is likely to be a failed state. All the proposals for governing Gaza after a ceasefire, ranging from PA control to a return of Hamas rule to long-term Israel occupation, seem to be non-starters for political reasons on the Israeli, Palestinian, or international community end of things or due to their infeasible nature. The default result is that no one really governs Gaza, which would at best have a few pockets of stability but also areas of constant violence, with Hamas waging a low-level insurgency against Israeli forces and their local allies and Israeli forces repeatedly striking Hamas leaders to prevent the group from reconstituting. The likely result is that Gaza will be a perpetual source of regional strife, with mini-crises and low-level violence frequent, and the people of Gaza continuing to suffer.
None of these possible changes are certain, and at times crises and horrible conflicts lead to caution and peace: the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war was met with predictions of renewed conflict, when in fact both sides preferred to avoid another round of disastrous conflict, leading to many years of stability. Yet the risks of renewed war and worsening regional conditions seem real, and even if there is good news on a ceasefire we should temper our hopes for a return to normalcy in the Middle East.