Europe Should Ride Two Nuclear Horses

image by Aliyah Jamous at Unsplash

Renewed European debate about nuclear deterrence, reflected in growing mistrust of the so-called American nuclear umbrella is a noteworthy consequence of Donald Trump’s return to the White House.

The stability of the transatlantic nuclear relationship fundamentally hinges on a single question: Will US leaders be willing to risk enormous damage to protect Europe – or a small European state? Whenever European leaders’ faith in US risk tolerance begins to shift to the negative, elite skepticism about the credibility of US nuclear guarantees rise. As Europeans continue to debate the credibility of American promises, Europe should continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, while making plans for a European nuclear capability.

THE ROOTS OF UNCERTAINTY

On paper, little has changed in US nuclear policy. The Trump administration has not given any concrete signals that they intend to weaken the nuclear umbrella. For example, there are no signs that they want to withdraw American nuclear weapons –deployed in five European NATO countries – from Europe.

At the same time, the nuclear guarantees are inextricably linked to a broader confidence in the intentions of the United States. The Trump administration in words and deeds has undermined transatlantic trust in a fundamental and potentially irreversible way. By expressing support for right-wing extremists in German elections, refusing to rule out the use of force to secure control of Greenland and publicly scolding Volodymyr Zelensky, the Trump administration has sent shockwaves through Europe.

Trump has also stated that the United States will not assist NATO members who do not contribute enough. Although there have been tensions within the alliance in the past, previous American leaders have rarely, if ever, created doubt as to whether the United States will come to Europe's aid. Many Europeans have also realized that it would be naïve to hope that the next US leader will be a more "normal" president who repairs the transatlantic relationship. Therefore, even stalwart allies are preparing for a major shift. As the recently released Norwegian National Security Strategy states, “the continued extensive US military presence in Europe is not a given.” The trajectory of security thinking is that Europe can no longer be 100 percent confident that the US will remain the long-term guarantor of the continent’s security.

A EURODETERRENT?

The problem for Europe is that the likely alternatives to the US nuclear umbrella have fundamental shortcomings with few concrete initiatives to resolve them. The most obvious solution is that France, most likely in cooperation with the United Kingdom, should offer a nuclear umbrella to other European countries.

In mid-May President Macron revealed that France has been in discussions with other European countries about a “Eurodeterrent” and the potential deployment of nuclear weapons in other countries. But he also confirmed that Paris would not pay for any protection it provides other countries, that any deployment of nuclear weapons to other countries must not undermine French national deterrence, and that Paris would maintain sole control over its nuclear weapons.

These positions raise a number of questions for Europe. At the outset, a Eurodeterrent would face the same basic credibility challenge as the US nuclear umbrella. Why should Baltic countries trust that France, or the UK, for that matter, will risk nuclear annihilation for their sake? The British and French could take steps to strengthen the credibility of the guarantees, but they, like the United States has for decades, would face challenges related to credibility that they will have to address.

A skewed balance of forces amplifies the challenges of credibility. The nuclear arsenals of either France or Britain lack the size to offer extended deterrence to the whole of Europe. Russia has close to 4400 operational nuclear warheads. France has about 300 warheads, Great Britain about 225. While the two European states by no means need to match Russia in numbers to ensure credible deterrence, lower inventories in France and the UK create several potential problems with their nuclear posture.

Although France has expressed willingness to station French nuclear weapons outside its borders, a number of critical questions remain unanswered. For example, given the limited size of the French arsenal, it is doubtful whether France can or would be willing to deploy as many weapons outside its borders as the United States. Furthermore, Macron’s statements about funding raise the question of who would pay for them?

Another problem is how to address Russian threats to use so-called tactical nuclear weapons. Russia has large quantities of tactical nuclear weapons, and in a crisis, it can threaten to use them in Europe to force their adversary to bow out. France and Britain lack such weapons, and while they could develop them, it would be a time-consuming and expensive endeavor.

As for the UK, its nuclear dependent relationship with the US creates another challenge. Britain leases its submarine-launched Trident-II missiles (although not the warheads) from the United States. Although the British could develop a more independent capability, any crisis in relations with the United States could affect their nuclear capability over the short term.

In addition to such practical problems, political challenges also stand in the way of France and the UK offering a regional nuclear umbrella. In France, there is political opposition on both the far right and the far left to offering extended deterrence through French nuclear weapons. Any upheaval in France, caused by ongoing cleavages in the French political system, would therefore endanger the credibility of its nuclear commitment to Europe.

HEDGING EUROPEAN BETS

Given these factors, what can other countries in Europe do to meet these challenges? For some, it may appear tempting to develop their own nuclear weapons. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has hinted at such a possibility by saying that Poland must consider developing more destructive weapons. However, developing nuclear weapons is highly demanding. Simply acquiring or producing enough fissile material for a small number of weapons can be difficult and time-consuming for many states. If a country like Poland is to develop a credible deterrence capability, it would need a large and functional arsenal that can survive a Russian attack. Such a process is long, expensive, and rife with technical, political, financial and military challenges.

A better solution for Europe is a nuclear hedging strategy. Europe should ride two nuclear horses: Seek to maintain the nuclear umbrella of the United States while simultaneously developing a more robust and credible indigenous European deterrent.

There is no reason for Europe to throw away its nuclear relationship with the US. Even weakened security guarantees can be good enough to deter Russia. As British Defense Minister Denis Healey famously stated during the Cold War, it “only takes a 5 percent credibility of American retaliation to deter an attack [from the Soviets], but it takes a 95 percent credibility to reassure the allies.” Given the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war, it may not take much to stop Russia, even though it may be difficult to reassure allies

However, there is nothing to prevent European countries from continuing discussions about alternatives. The United States has long advocated that Europe must take more responsibility for its own security. Developing robust nuclear deterrent would be the ultimate way to take on this responsibility.

To be sure, the road to such a deterrent would be arduous, and some of the fundamental questions about credibility can at best be ameliorated. Nevertheless, it would be strategic malpractice if Europe did not have a Plan B available if the transatlantic relationship deteriorated and US security guarantees lapsed.