Reassessing Stability in Syria

Where I Was Wrong (and Right)

Almost a year ago, I wrote a cautionary piece in the New York Times warning of the dangers that lay ahead for Syria in the aftermath of the overthrow of dictator Bashar al-Assad. I used the precedents of the U.S. experiences in Afghanistan (2001-2021) and Iraq (2003-2011) to caution that liberation moments often shade into disorder, sectarian violence, and extremist resurgence. For Syria I warned of six potential problems:

• The questionable competence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — the former al-Qaeda linked organization turned government — and the uncertain commitment of its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to good governance and the rights of Syrian citizens;

• The risk of jihadist violence, whether from an HTS backslide to its jihadist origins or due to the growth of the Islamic State due to state weakness;

• The disastrous economic condition of Syria after decades of brutal dictatorship and civil war and the lack of eager reconstruction partners;

• Chaos in Syria as different factions fought one another for power and ordinary citizens sought revenge on their oppressors;

• Outside meddling by neighbors like Turkey and Israel; and

• A lack of U.S. interest in helping stabilize Syria

In general, many of my concerns and predictions proved valid. Syria has suffered communal violence, with Syria’s bedouin and Druze communities clashing. Over 1,000 people died, and many more were displaced, with the Druze in particular suffering. Israel has repeatedly intervened to protect the Druze and to keep Syria weak militarily, while Turkey has increased its support for the HTS government and sought to keep the Kurds weak. Syria’s Kurdish community is not fully integrated into the state while the Islamic State has tried to exploit the weakness of the Syrian government and the reduction in U.S. military forces to increase its activities. The United States cut its forces in Syria roughly by half, and there are now fewer than 1,000 troops there.

Although many specifics proved correct, my prognosis was pessimistic, and a year later I am more optimistic about Syria. The country has seen considerable violence, but it has not collapsed into all-out civil war and shows no signs of doing so. Although the United States has reduced its military role, it has remained involved diplomatically (and helped protect its Kurdish allies and their efforts to contain the Islamic State). The Trump administration, with the encouragement of U.S. allies in the Gulf, has reduced economic sanctions on Syria and hosted the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa at the White House, a first for a Syrian leader (let alone a former jihadist). The Gulf states also stepped up economic support, providing much-needed aid, investment, and debt relief.

Part of this reason I am more optimistic is that I have underestimated the pragmatism of the al-Sharaa-led government. Sharaa has courted President Trump and Gulf state leaders and has sought to avoid inflaming tensions with Israel. He has also fought hard against the Islamic State and Hezbollah, gaining credibility as a result.

Although predicting the actions of any person suddenly thrust into the world spotlight is difficult, less forgivably I also underestimated HTS’s ability to lead a government. HTS had a long track record of governance in Idlib, where it developed institutions and proved its capability to govern. Local Kurdish groups, too, governed territory they controlled while the civil war raged, leaving them as at least somewhat legitimate holders of power at the local level when the Assad regime fell.

This stands in contrast to the Iraqi and Afghan regimes, which were imposed with U.S. support and, as a result, never went through the more Darwinian learn-to-govern-or-die process that many revolutionary groups must do and often suffered from a legitimacy deficit because they came to power with the support of the U.S. military. The lessons I drew from Iraq and Afghanistan should have reflected the greater competence and local legitimacy of the Syrian actors.

I still have many concerns about Syria. The government is too weak to prevent low-level violence, and Israel shows no sign of halting its interventions. Although Syria has attracted outside financial support, donor fatigue is real, and Syria’s needs are immense – far more so than the limited aid the country has been promised so far. I do not expect the Islamic State to use Syria as a base for international terrorist attacks, but it will remain a violent threat to communities in both Iraq and Syria. Al-Sharaa, while less brutal and more inclusive than Assad (the lowest bar possible), remains an authoritarian leader, and Syria is unlikely to move toward democracy.

Looking ahead, however, the trajectory in Syria offers grounds for cautious confidence. The new government’s unexpectedly pragmatic posture, its hard-earned legitimacy in key regions, and the willingness of external actors—from Washington to the Gulf capitals—to invest diplomatically and economically have together created a more resilient foundation than I anticipated a year ago. Syria’s challenges remain formidable, but they no longer seem insurmountable. Syria has the opportunity to consolidate its fragile stability and begin the long process of national recovery. For policymakers and analysts alike, the task now is not simply to catalog risks but to help shape conditions in which a more peaceful and functional Syrian state can take root.