Great, really helpful essay. In a future iteration, could you address the distinctions between an internationalist nationalist GS vs an isolationist one? It might be thought of as different means to the same end.
thanks for reading, Al! It's certainly true that we could see a range of nationalist strategies: some with a lower threshold for projecting force abroad, and some with a higher bar. But generally (as I will be arguing in a forthcoming post, actually) people advocating a nationalist strategy are very much in favor of extensive international interaction in terms of commerce, finance, science & technology, etc. So there just really aren't people out there who advocate isolationism. Stay tuned for more on this theme.
But that doesn't seem true of Trump personally. As many people, including Noah Smith, note, to the extent he has a coherent commerce policy, he wants to tariff friendly countries out, not just China.
Fair enough. But what label then is best for the folks, for example, who want to bar finding for Ukraine? That would prefer the US to be out of NATO? Happy with the collapse of the TPP? The republican party's core identity was at one time internationalist backed by strong defense. Feels much less so today. So if that's not an isolationist tilt, how would you frame it then?
"These alliances already survived a Trump presidency; the question is whether they can again: whether the allies will continue to trust a security partner with an unraveling consensus."
The European powers as members of NATO, and American Pacific Rim allies/partners like South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, may well have maintained stronger capabilities, and a stronger range of capabilities, with more autonomous deterrent capability, and ability to even exercise influence over the Ukraine situation autonomously if they had *less* trust in the United States rather than more.
The American globalist love affair with "being trusted" by allies, and being followed by them has created a moral hazard of possibly misplaced trust, excessive dependency, and a decaying sense of hardpower realpolitik intellectual and physical infrastructure among US allies, save Israel and Turkey, leaving them potentially vulnerable to sudden abandonment by a Trump-like nationalist figure.
A question I've put out there on multiple international discussion boards since 2022 has been, "what has your country done, what should your country do, to hedge against the prospect of 'The Trump-Putin Pact of 2025'?" Clock's-a-tickin'.
"In 2003 Democrats and Republicans agreed that toppling Saddam Hussein was a vital national security interest:" - Strictly speaking true. Additional adjectives would also be true: "In 2003 [a substantial minority of] Democrats and Republicans agreed that toppling Saddam Hussein was a vital national security interest:"
Great, really helpful essay. In a future iteration, could you address the distinctions between an internationalist nationalist GS vs an isolationist one? It might be thought of as different means to the same end.
thanks for reading, Al! It's certainly true that we could see a range of nationalist strategies: some with a lower threshold for projecting force abroad, and some with a higher bar. But generally (as I will be arguing in a forthcoming post, actually) people advocating a nationalist strategy are very much in favor of extensive international interaction in terms of commerce, finance, science & technology, etc. So there just really aren't people out there who advocate isolationism. Stay tuned for more on this theme.
But that doesn't seem true of Trump personally. As many people, including Noah Smith, note, to the extent he has a coherent commerce policy, he wants to tariff friendly countries out, not just China.
Fair enough. But what label then is best for the folks, for example, who want to bar finding for Ukraine? That would prefer the US to be out of NATO? Happy with the collapse of the TPP? The republican party's core identity was at one time internationalist backed by strong defense. Feels much less so today. So if that's not an isolationist tilt, how would you frame it then?
My way or the highway-ism?
"These alliances already survived a Trump presidency; the question is whether they can again: whether the allies will continue to trust a security partner with an unraveling consensus."
The European powers as members of NATO, and American Pacific Rim allies/partners like South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, may well have maintained stronger capabilities, and a stronger range of capabilities, with more autonomous deterrent capability, and ability to even exercise influence over the Ukraine situation autonomously if they had *less* trust in the United States rather than more.
The American globalist love affair with "being trusted" by allies, and being followed by them has created a moral hazard of possibly misplaced trust, excessive dependency, and a decaying sense of hardpower realpolitik intellectual and physical infrastructure among US allies, save Israel and Turkey, leaving them potentially vulnerable to sudden abandonment by a Trump-like nationalist figure.
A question I've put out there on multiple international discussion boards since 2022 has been, "what has your country done, what should your country do, to hedge against the prospect of 'The Trump-Putin Pact of 2025'?" Clock's-a-tickin'.
"In 2003 Democrats and Republicans agreed that toppling Saddam Hussein was a vital national security interest:" - Strictly speaking true. Additional adjectives would also be true: "In 2003 [a substantial minority of] Democrats and Republicans agreed that toppling Saddam Hussein was a vital national security interest:"